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This chapter builds a comparative picture of the interrelation of redistribu-
tion and financialized debt in two different national contexts. It does so not 
by adding to the already voluminous literature written from a neo-Marxist 
or anarchic anticapitalist perspective, nor by endorsing the position of 
free-market fundamentalists, but by exploring a kind of middle ground 
between them. This is the arena where a “mixed economy,” long preva-
lent in the funding and administering of welfare (Cunningham 1998), has 
become even more dominant in recent times; where we find a “pluralist 
hybrid of market, non-market (e.g., redistribution by the welfare state) 
and non-monetary (based on reciprocity) forms of economy” (Alexander 
2010). Animated by the work of authors who have explored the “ethics of 
care” (Fraser 2014; Lawson 2007), and the complex ways in which these 
inform the “new public good” (Bear and Mathur 2015), I seek to chal-
lenge deterministic accounts of the ways in which financialized capital-
ism is experienced by those on its margins. These suggest, inter alia, that 
capitalism in its newest form ceaselessly seeks out new zones for profit 
(Lapavitsas 2013), now including those at the bottom of the pyramid; that 
capitalist accumulation is further facilitated in this process (Harvey 2003); 
and that democratic/civil options have dissolved as subjects and are recon-
figured in the form of a new and more insidious type of homo economicus 
(Brown 2015).
My account takes two very different settings, one from the global North 
(austerity Britain) and the other from the global South (post-democracy 
South Africa), and illustrates both commonalities and contrasts between 
them. Both have seen a complex mix of expanding financialization and 
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increased borrowing with (actual, in the UK case, or imminent, in the 
South African one) government austerity, and the retreat of the kind of 
state regulation that formerly curbed the fees and interest rates creditors 
were able to charge. Those at the bottom of the pile—be they the poor or 
unemployed, low-paid workers, or formerly middle-class people migrating 
to work abroad and now on “zero hours” contracts—have been brought 
into the ambit of, or “enfolded within,” formal financialized arrangements 
(Kar 2018, this volume; Meagher 2018; Soederberg 2014). In the terms 
used by Gustav Peebles (2010), they are not so much beneficiaries of its 
good side (“credit”), as victims of its most rapacious aspects (“debt”). Such 
accounts point to the fact that the shrinking of the welfare state in north-
ern settings and its new instantiation via the provision of cash transfers 
in southern ones seem to lead inexorably—albeit in different ways as 
documented below—to an increase in borrowing: what Soederberg calls 
“debtfare” (2014). Against this backdrop, I demonstrate the often-counter-
intuitive ways in which financialized capitalism, even as some of its logics 
and agents plunge people further into debt, also provides funds to ensure 
that welfare arrangements are not erased altogether. I attend to the ways 
in which borrowers/welfare recipients—and those who provide them with 
advice—battle to secure the welfare that is due to them, and to the emerg-
ing folk models of fiscal behavior or “householding” that emerge in the 
course of such interactions.
One might query the validity of such an exercise. Surely the global spread 
of financialized techniques and the making of money “from nothing” 
(James 2015) or “from money” (Harvey 2003) involve transnational cor-
porations, use standardized technologies of extraction, and must have a 
uniformly deleterious (and broadly homogenizing) effect worldwide? It is 
not my intention to present an idealized image of forms of support that 
transcend the stark realities of capitalist exploitation, nor to flatly deny the 
claims of scholars in a neo-Marxist/Foucauldian tradition who are inclined 
to see activist/adviser/volunteers as doing the state’s work for it by provid-
ing momentary redress and protection against the worst effects of capital-
ism or austerity (see Koch and James, forthcoming). Rather, my account 
is motivated by a recognition that activities at the boundaries of formal 
processes, even if these are initiated or funded by commercial companies, 
can mitigate and counter what would otherwise be the exclusion of poorer 
people (Kirwan, McDermont, and Clarke 2016); and by ideas about “care 
ethics” that move us “beyond critique and toward the construction of new 
forms of relationships, institutions, and action that enhance mutuality and 
well-being” (Lawson 2007).
Central to this chapter is a focus on agencies and activists who embrace a 
normative view of bureaucratic techniques. Often outside of but entangled 
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with state purview, they deploy these techniques to protect welfare benefits 
that are under threat. They thus try to ensure fairness of redistribution. The 
“new orienting values” they embrace are equated by Bear and Mathur with 
the “new public good”: a slippery and often contradictory-sounding phe-
nomenon that combines the unlikely bedfellows of “fiscal discipline, mar-
ketization, consensus, transparency and decentralization . . . [which] are 
associated with the market ethics of the economist’s public good and are 
linked to new technical mechanisms of accountability. But their resonances 
as an ethos, a lived persona, a contested referent or frustrating impossible 
goal cannot be captured in their social reality by economists’ models or the 
analysis of audit techniques alone” (2015). The “new orienting values” of 
bureaucracy that these activists hold dear are thus entangled with “market 
ethics” rather than opposed to them.
Redistribution and financialization can and do intersect; although on 
the face of it, they may seem incompatible: one embodies social values; 
the other is planted in and arises from the world of impersonal contracts. 
Many anthropologists, and famously Polanyi, have seen redistribution as a 
quintessentially nonmarket, premarket, or antimarket process (see Hann 
and Hart 2009). Economists, although preoccupied (especially in the early 
years of the modern neoclassical discipline) with the formal logic of how 
income and wages are determined, and how and whether redistribution 
might factor in these processes, are ultimately left to conclude that redis-
tribution is a matter of exogenous ethics (or philosophies of justice) rather 
than being an intrinsic part of the calculus of economic growth (Sandmo 
2015). Similarly, theorists like Jon Elster point to the way that “redistrib-
utive policies . . . are intended to compensate people for various sorts of 
bad luck, arising mainly in the market” (Elster 1991: 273). Putting it more 
strongly, Göran Therborn (2012b: 587) writes of how “redistribution and 
recompensation are powerful tools,” arising largely out of the struggles of 
the labor movement, through which “remedial action” can be undertaken 
to counter the egregious inequalities that arise out of the unequal distribu-
tion of income and wealth. The usual assumption is that such “tools” have 
to be applied by society and/or the state in order to curb the worst excesses 
of capitalist exploitation and free trade. Feminist philosopher Nancy Fraser, 
offering a reinterpretation of Polanyi’s ideas on “fictitious commodities,” 
similarly shows how the forces of the market, which may promote growth 
but which lead to exploitation and inequality, are deemed to be incompati-
ble with those of the state and society (2014: 547). As Hann and Hart put it 
“the leading capitalist societies at one stage all signed up for Hegel’s (1821) 
idea that states should try to contain the inequality and ameliorate the 
social misery generated by markets” (2009: 2). From these underpinnings, 
in postwar Europe, was the welfare state born.
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However, Polanyi’s morally loaded binary between market (or contract) 
and benevolent nonmarket (variously construed as “society,” “state,” or 
“mutuality”) is too simple (Gudeman 2010). For one thing, as Nancy Fraser 
points out, it obscures relations of power and domination. To entrust the 
upholding of communal, family, or welfarist values to unpaid and non-
commodified care regimes may mean devaluing female activities, whereas 
paying for that work by bringing it into the realm of contract (the labor 
market) may serve emancipatory goals (2014: 550).
All this is to say that provisioning and welfare can no longer be assumed 
to exist beyond the world of the financial, nor do they depend solely on 
state- or society-driven initiatives. Anthropologist Erik Bähre, writing 
about post-democracy South Africa, argues for an “important complica-
tion” of the redistribution concept: “When diverse institutions are infused 
by redistribution, it becomes difficult to distinguish redistribution from 
other forms of economic integration.” Rather, it is “entangled with and a 
part of” both “the state (social grants and development aid)” and “markets 
(commercial insurances)” (2011: 375). It is well documented that, since 
the 1980s, voluntary sector activities and market-oriented arrangements 
have modified and mediated state-driven initiatives (Alexander 2010). But 
Bähre is making a more provocative claim: he argues that the sudden and 
swift inclusion of black South Africans as potential clients for insurance 
companies enables them to engage with impersonal and “large-scale” insti-
tutions for economic reallocation and thus escape from onerous forms of 
neighbor- or kin-based reciprocity. It is these “large-scale” arrangements 
that Bähre sees as the central characteristic of redistribution. Those who 
readily embrace it are people—such as upwardly mobile members of the 
new middle class in South Africa—who seek to escape the more personal-
ized sharing, lending, and helping that typified life under apartheid.
Bähre’s interest in “complicating” the redistribution concept points us 
toward a zone where market and nonmarket dynamics interpenetrate. But 
his insistence on large-scale processes is somewhat misleading. Faced with 
the dissolution, privatization, and insidious undermining of state-based 
welfare provision, I show in what follows that it is precisely through per-
sonalized and piecemeal relationships between debtors and their  activist/
advisers—positioned between market, state, and society yet not fully 
aligned with any of these—that redistribution must now be largely pursued. 
It is in the course of interactions between debtfare recipients and what 
Elster calls “second-order decision makers” (Elster 1991) that some of the 
worst effects of financialized capitalism are challenged and countered.
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“Mixed Economies” of Welfare
In the 1990s and 2000s, as financialized capitalism was consolidated world-
wide, more and more relatively poor people became dependent on readily 
available loans to supplement state welfare. Yet it is too simple to argue that 
“welfare” became “debtfare” (Soederberg 2014) or that former welfare ben-
eficiaries have been transformed into repayers of debt (Adkins 2017). The 
involvement of market (and specifically financial) actors in redistribution 
is more complex.
In the UK, much debt advice is funded by creditors. Following the 
onset of austerity measures adopted by the Coalition and Conservative 
Governments in the 2010s, the gap between incomes and expenditures has 
grown incrementally, forcing many people to borrow in order to pay rent and 
other crucial expenses (Davey 2017, this volume; Patrick 2017: 70–73). The 
average UK household debt (including mortgages) was £58,540 in June 2018, 
and people owed nearly £1.6 trillion, up from £1.55tn the previous year.1 
Parallel to the sharp upturn in private debt, the withdrawal of state funding 
to the advice sector has led to a situation in which debt advice, introduced in 
the 1980s alongside the expansion of consumer credit and formerly deriving 
from general taxation, is now privately funded on the basis of “fair share” 
contributions from creditors and a bank levy on the basis of a “polluter pays” 
principle (Davey 2017: 8–9). This is an industry-specific levy, channeled 
toward offsetting the harms produced by that industry. Davey describes 
the system as “self-defeating,” since it encourages people “to re-engage with 
credit markets” and thus “serves the interests of the financial industry”; 
“it taxes the agencies that lend to poorer people at high rates of interest 
in order to give those same people advice that is increasingly redundant” 
(Davey 2017). The cases discussed here, however, show that debt advisors’ 
interventions do not simply function to ensure that debtors repay what they 
owe to the financial institutions that fund their operations. When advising 
their poorer clients whose loans are predominantly unsecured ones, they 
typically encourage clients to weigh up repaying the banks with repaying 
other creditors that may have more importance. A rising number of clients 
struggle with so-called “priority debts,” especially rent arrears owed to land-
lords and council tax owed to the local state, “whose non-repayment would 
produce the greatest consequences, from the presence of bailiffs through 
to the loss of one’s home and imprisonment” (Kirwan 2018). Advisers thus 
often act in view of logics that are guided by imperatives other than those of 
the mainstream lenders that pay them.
In South Africa, the funding of initiatives that combat debt problems, 
relatively miniscule to start with, has expanded thanks to the initiatives of 
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companies, private individuals, and churches. The sharp rise in indebted-
ness here resulted from expectations of prosperity following democratiza-
tion in a climate of economic liberalization. What followed was a situation 
of “explosive lending, intensive credit surveillance and ongoing reluctance 
from the large banks to offer services to the rural poor” (Breckenridge 
2019; see James 2015). Following a sharp rise in the provision and uptake 
of unsecured, high interest loans in the early 1990s (Ardington et al. 2004), 
by 2014, the World Bank noted that 86 percent of South Africans had taken 
out a loan, more than double the global average of 40 percent. Around half 
of these borrowers were at least three months behind on debt payments, 
and the debt-to-income ratio stood at 86.4 percent (James 2019: 218). What 
these stark figures do not reveal is the extremely low level of consumer pro-
tection, which has enabled the collection of debt from the wages of employ-
ees via poorly regulated or—increasingly—forged “garnishee” orders,2 and 
more recently, by biometric means, in the shape of deductions from social 
welfare payments made to poor people.
Advice services to deal with these problems have never been more than 
patchy. Although free, independently funded advice from trained lawyers 
was (and remains) available in some university law clinics, and was pro-
vided in certain areas by human- and consumer-rights organization The 
Black Sash and its regional associates, “debt counseling” was typically con-
strued as an income-generating activity and outsourced to often poorly 
prepared entrepreneurs (James 2015: 62, 71, 94; Schraten 2014: 11). As 
donations to consumer rights charities by overseas church-based organiza-
tions have dwindled, companies, foundations, and private individuals have 
had to shoulder more of the burden, usually in partnerships with commu-
nity-based organizations in specific neighborhoods. In the absence of more 
comprehensive and concrete “on-the-ground” advice, “cause- lawyering” 
efforts (Sarat and Sheingold 1998) have concentrated on high-profile 
court cases with the aim of establishing legal precedents or modifying 
legislation. Besides helping to provide funding for both advice and legal 
costs, certain companies have branches or subsidiaries that aim to curb 
the worst activities of lenders—in the courts and elsewhere. Given that a 
“cowboy capitalist” extractivist ethic has prevailed in the country for over 
a century (see Van Onselen 2017), this includes countering the activities of 
those who often masquerade as helpful advisers/helpers but are often, in 
fact, intent on making profit from the poor.3 Taking the form of a kind of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, those who act to curb such profiteering—
in  particular a firm called Summit Financial Partners—do so partly at the 
behest of, and paid for by, employers. Running scared in the wake of events 
like the Marikana trade union protest, where miners demanding higher pay 
turned out to be forfeiting most of their wages to high-interest lenders via 
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automatic deductions (Alexander et al. 2012; James and Rajak 2014), many 
employers wish to ensure that their workers have a sustainable form of life.
In sum, then, the involvement of financial actors in both settings is not 
confined to the provision of loans, but extends to funding and even initiat-
ing the work—principally by challenging wrongdoing by moneylenders—
which makes it possible to resist such demands. The activists and advisors 
draw on funds from the “mixed economy” on which the charitable/welfare 
sector has long relied. They see their job as exercising surveillance over 
the activities of state actors, while also constraining the worst ravages of 
commercial creditors. They try to persuade welfare/debtfare beneficiaries 
to follow appropriate courses of action in the interests of living a sustain-
able life. Making sure that trickles of funds continue to reach poor people, 
they have become the ultimate redistributors in settings where, because of 
austerity measures in the UK and the depredations of predatory lending 
in South Africa, other instruments of redistribution have been severely 
weakened.
Mastering Bureaucracy between State and Market
To illustrate how this works in practice, let us explore the two settings in 
more detail. In both the UK and the South African cases, literature on 
the psychosocial aspects of debt helps us conceptualize both the way that 
financialization is “domesticated” (Deville and Seigworth 2015) and the 
way its domestication is, in turn, dislodged. In the UK case, debtors have 
become accustomed to “living in default”; “market attachments” (Deville 
2015) often make them unable to envisage ever living outside of it. The 
strength of these attachments and ties is intensified via banking algo-
rithms that make it possible for “monies of all sorts to routinely live in 
and through our lives” and for the relationships between creditors and 
debtors to “become deeper, more profound, more granular, more personal” 
(Tiessen 2015). Here, debt advisors’ work must focus on “disrupting” these 
attachments (Kirwan 2018), using a set of bureaucratic tools to counter the 
strong emotions involved in order to help clients distinguish those which 
ought—in their own best interests—to be given priority, or where they can 
be dodged or even cancelled through a variety of bankruptcy procedures.
In the complex amalgam of commercial borrowings and what is owed to 
the state that makes up a beneficiary’s “debtfare” portfolio in the UK, debt 
advice involves interacting with a range of companies and institutions on a 
client’s behalf. In one case, Elaine, a domestic cleaner, consulted Aaminah, 
an officer in a London debt advice office, after receiving a letter from a 
credit card company that had taken out a court order requiring her to pay 
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£50 monthly to settle her debt. She also owed her internet provider £48, 
and had a debt with Provident and one with Shop Direct that had been sold 
on to a debt-collection company (see Mikus, this volume). Aaminah, after 
sifting through documents, noting income, budgets, and owings, reassured 
Elaine that, compared to other clients, her total debt of less than £2,000 
was not as big as it seemed. Seeking a way to tackle each of its separate 
components (see Kirwan 2016: 467), Aaminah wrote a note requesting that 
the court order for the credit card debt be lessened (or “varied”), wrote a 
letter asking the court to excuse Elaine from paying fees, and sent a written 
request to her other creditors for a stay of six months to give Elaine some 
time. She also outlined the possibility, in the long-term, of applying for a 
Debt Relief Order4 to write off the debt.
Working part-time, Elaine took pride in earning her own living; but she 
relied, besides her wage and the money she had borrowed to supplement 
it, on various systems of state support. In a mosaic of benefits that had 
waxed and waned over the years, she was receiving child tax credits and 
working tax credits, and was waiting to hear the outcome of her application 
for housing benefit to help pay her rent. Aaminah worked out that Elaine 
had two so-called “priority debts” that were more important than the ones 
she owes to the commercial sector: seven weeks’ rent arrears amounting to 
£850 and council tax—charged for various municipal services—of £70, for 
which the council had sent her a letter instructing her to settle the backlog 
within two working days. To avoid a visit from the bailiffs and to remain in 
her flat, Elaine understood that she had no option but to pay these “priority 
debts.” Aaminah sent an email to the council to ask them to delay taking 
action and, given the expectation of a positive decision concerning housing 
benefit, to set up a regular payment in order to clear the arrears.
Compared with the “economies of default” investigated by Deville and his 
collaborators in the UK, in the South African case, debtors tend to be more 
aware of the need to juggle and prioritize debts, even without formal debt 
advice. Possibly due in part to the lack of such advice, they may be shrewdly 
pragmatic rather than “attached” to their debts or seized by a psychic desire 
for “things.” Akhona, a domestic cleaner like Elaine, was similarly reliant on 
a mixture of commercial loans and state welfare. “Sometimes I only get paid 
R1,800 [about 98GBP] a month,”5 she was reported as saying. “And it’s not 
enough because transport is expensive and I have to buy household things, 
and support other family members.” Supplementing her wage as a part-time 
worker were a monthly child-support grant from SASSA (the state welfare 
agency) of R640 and a regular monthly loan of R200 from a company called 
Moneyline. This was a subsidiary of Net1/Cash Paymaster Services, the 
company to which the state had outsourced the delivery of these welfare or 
“social” grants in the early 2000s. Akhona needed this loan in order to pay 
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her weekly transport bill to get to work.6 Much like the shack-dwellers doc-
umented by Ariel Wilkis in Buenos Aires, one of whom told him “we don’t 
have savings but we do have debt” (2018), Akhona had factored in borrow-
ing as an essential element in the household budget rather than an acciden-
tal aberration. Such canny matter-of-factness has also been documented by 
anthropologist Fiona Ross (2010). Being poor involves managing a series of 
conflicting debts and often necessitates taking short-term decisions, them-
selves subject to scrutiny and criticism from relatives and neighbors, which 
might need to be immediately reassessed and altered. This leads to a patchy 
and fragmented experience of time and monetary value. A quandary over 
allocating funds involved both trust in providence and careful deliberation 
for a woman called Sandra, who owed money both for her son’s school fees 
and to complete her installments on a cupboard that she paid a “lay-bye” 
to secure (if she failed to honor the agreement by a certain date, she would 
forfeit both the cupboard and the payments already made). She decided to 
use the money set aside for school fees to pay off the cupboard, presuming 
later to be able to rely on a relative’s help for the fees or “pay them off over 
the year.” The choice was between education (for which others might be 
pressured into paying) or respectability and social propriety (the costs of 
which would have to be borne by the household). In this case, the choice 
paid off. A well-wisher gave money for the school fees, while owning the 
cupboard enhanced her status (Ross 2010: 131).
In other cases, however, social grant recipients are unable to parse and 
weigh up their debts, because their interweaving makes them difficult to 
disentangle and conceptualize as separate “pieces of money” or as dis-
tinct amounts (Wilkis 2017). Technologies of biometric registration have 
brought the millions of South Africans who are grant recipients within 
the ambit of the banking system (cf. Kar, this volume). Banking algorithms 
achieve their goals through sheer automation. Until it was relieved of its 
state contract in October 2018, the provider company, Net1, had turned 
social welfare into debt collateral through financial transactions that were 
virtually immune to human intervention (see Lavinas 2018 for a similar 
case in Brazil). While South Africa, like the UK, uses automated credit 
transfers to deliver welfare (see Datta 2012: 32–36, 66; see also Kar, this 
volume), their respective approaches to banking and to client privacy are 
very different. South Africa’s Net1 had not only been furnishing regular 
payments to pensioners, parents (mostly mothers) of children, and disabled 
people, it also had been offering them loans and selling them products—via 
its complex web of subsidiaries and using agents paid on commission—for 
which it was deducting payments from the grant at the end of the month.7 
People were coming in “with tears in their eyes. . . . With regard to the 
unauthorized deductions on their SASSA grant, you realize these people 
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feel disempowered. . . . We had one woman here that was in tears about the 
fact that she felt so abused by the system and she had no recourse,” I was 
told by Mareesa Kreuser, a team member at Summit Financial Partners. 
Debt advisers, activists, paralegals, and financial sector companies, such as 
the one for which she works, have been engaged in a common (though not 
always united) endeavor to counter the “machinic” extractivism (Lazzarato 
2012) facilitated by the algorithms used in the lending sector.
Householding and Clawing Back Funds
Advisers in both the UK and South Africa help clients list and conceptual-
ize their incomings and outgoings. They aim to prevent clients from getting 
caught up in arrangements that will make their money trickle away, and 
to help them reclaim that money once taken. They take action to combat 
aggressive—sometimes illegal—actions of creditors, both in market and 
state arenas. What is already a pitifully small amount of money must not be 
allowed to dwindle further because of extortionate interest (now increas-
ingly reconfigured as “charges”) or councils reclaiming erroneous payouts. 
In both cases, there is a sense of the need to “put a finger in the dyke” to 
ensure that money does not escape. The way the advisers accomplish this, 
in both settings, follows the original principles of Aristotle’s oekonomia, 
as echoed more recently in the school subject that used to be known as 
“home economics” or “domestic science.” Oekonomia implies perpetuating 
self-sufficiency through careful household budgeting rather than engaging 
in risky trade through market transactions (Hann and Hart 2009: 11).
In the London debt advice office, Aaminah’s telephone calls and letters 
were aimed not only at forestalling and deflecting the demands of Elaine’s 
creditors but also at making sure she received all the benefits to which she 
was entitled, so that at some point these might enable a more viable house-
hold economy. In the course of “sorting out” Elaine’s finances, Aaminah 
drew up a Common Financial Statement, a spreadsheet that balanced her 
income on one side against her debt on the other (see James and Kirwan 
2019).8 A key (and little-known outside the sector) aspect of such an advis-
er’s work, and one that further blurs lines between state and market, is the 
way she helps clients withstand demands for repayment made by the state 
(Davey 2017: 9; Kirwan 2018). In a case similar to that of Elaine, Yusuf, an 
advisor at the North London Muslim Community Centre, helped an elderly 
client faced with an “overpayments” demand. Where welfare recipients 
like him owe a substantial sum to the council for benefits allegedly over-
paid, these are reclaimed or deducted from future benefits. This situation 
results from the piecemeal administering of a “mosaic” of funds by diverse 
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 agencies (Forbess and James 2014). They include “tax benefits” introduced 
by the Labor Government—though punitive changes from 2010 onward 
have restricted such payments—as a means of encouraging people to enter 
the labor market, and serving a moderate but important redistributive func-
tion in favor of the poorest households (Hills 2015: 2, 226). Yusuf ’s client 
produced a letter from the council reclaiming £16,000 allegedly overpaid 
for housing benefit and council tax. Yusuf phoned the council to ask for an 
explanation and was told, “we have checked with HMRC—he has two jobs, 
one for a security firm. . . . We are using good systems. . . . We have to do 
what it says on the screen.” Yusuf discovered that although it appeared as 
though the client was working for two companies, he was employed by only 
one—that had changed its name. Earning less than the tax office claimed, 
the client was thus entitled to both sets of benefits after all. Lodging such 
challenges is time consuming and requires the specialist knowledge and 
connections of the advisor. “I normally give a client one hour,” Yusuf said. 
Although success is far from certain, there is a sense that the ends of justice 
have been served when they do work out.
Like many “globally redistributive policies” that are “designed centrally, 
at the level of the national government” (Elster 1991: 273), clawing back 
money in this way requires the intervention of what Elster calls “second- 
order decision makers” in order to ensure that “local justice” is delivered. 
What the state gives in the name of redistribution it may take away in the 
name of equity or combating so-called benefits fraud. These demands may 
need to be resisted in turn: errors can result when misspent funds are col-
lected, and yet further intervention is needed to set matters right. Where 
enquiries reveal that the overpayment demands are justified, however, such 
clients are obliged to honor their obligations to noncommercial creditors 
such as the council, or face a visit from the bailiff.
Like other intermediaries charged with delivering “local justice” (Elster 
1991), with administering “care” to combat egregious market forces (Lawson 
2007), or with safeguarding the “public good” (Bear and Mathur 2015), 
Yusuf and Aaminah were committed to mastering bureaucratic techniques 
of allocation and to implementing these in line with the  redistributive spirit 
that is presumed to have animated their original design, no matter how 
much these may have been diverted or interrupted by subsequent auster-
ity measures (Elster 1991: 274). Where Elster’s account of “ second-order 
 decision makers” is chiefly concerned with state employees at local level, 
advisers like Yusuf and Aaminah work outside the ambit of the state to 
correct the errors made by its functionaries. While Elster contrasts the 
benefits and costs of using “discretion” and “impersonal mechanisms” 
respectively, these advisers do not consider themselves to be using person-
alized criteria to overturn the use of “mechanical formulae” (1991: 288). 
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Rather, they take pride in carrying out and adhering to—and holding their 
equivalents in the state bureaucracy to account to implement—the strictly 
fair arrangements that bureaucracy ought to embody.
In South Africa, Mareesa and other activist/advisers are equally keen 
to lay out all debts in logical array, establish which need to be repaid with 
greatest urgency, and resist those that are mistaken or unjust. But it is 
more difficult to “claw back” resources in the South African case for several 
reasons. First, although the impetus for commercial companies to tempt 
customers into taking out further loans and making further purchases 
differs little in the two cases, debtors in South Africa face particular prob-
lems because of the way repayments are secured. A beneficiary/client can 
be vulnerable to complex processes of deduction, especially one with a less 
deliberate budgeting strategy than Akhona, the domestic cleaner men-
tioned earlier who was borrowing from Moneyline to fund her monthly 
transport. Until 2018, when Net1 lost the tender to deliver grants, grant 
holders were able to swap their welfare benefits (“SASSA”) card for an alter-
native card known as “Easypay Everywhere,” also administered by Net1, 
and to apply for further loans to different moneylenders, for which further 
deductions were made. The proliferation of debts is potentially confusing, 
especially where—because of biometrically facilitated automation and the 
lack of a paper trail—little or no volition was left to the debtor. Although 
Easypay functioned as a bank account, few of its “clients” had postal or 
email addresses. In cases where team members from Summit or activist 
organizations like The Black Sash have sought to offer advice or help a 
beneficiary work out what she owed to whom, getting hold of “bank state-
ments” was challenging, if not impossible.
Even once procured, these statements are often incomprehensible, 
because debts are difficult to disentangle. Until October 2018, some ben-
eficiaries had two payment streams or “accounts”—the original “SASSA” 
card and the new “EasyPay” card. In one case I noted at a meeting, many 
of the deductions for airtime (telephone credit) had been moved from 
SASSA to Easypay, but other loans and the funeral cover payments still 
remained with SASSA; in another, each of these two accounts was linked 
to a separate mobile number. When attempts were made to seek recourse, 
company representatives were reluctant to speak to anyone but the “actual 
beneficiary.” “Actual beneficiaries,” however, rarely had enough airtime to 
be able to stay on the telephone for the amount of time that it might take 
to get through the “security questions” and challenge the details of the 
account—and in any case, they often felt intimidated, embarrassed, and 
unconfident when speaking English. Advisers also expressed dismay on 
their clients’ behalf that, despite all these transactions and loans taking 
place in a highly formalized payment space, errors were frequent, often 
This chapter of "Financialization," edited by Chris Hann and Don Kalb is available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, 
thanks to the support of the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC Grant ES/M003825/1 ‘An ethnography of 
advice: between market, society and the declining welfare state’), the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2016-518), and the LSE 
Anthropology’s RIIF fund.
208 •  Deborah James
amounting to fraud (practiced both by “street level” agents and at the 
level of high-tech deductions). Most worrisome among the latter was the 
tendency to treat beneficiaries’ payment streams as if they were current 
accounts with overdraft facilities. To comply with regulations in the 
National Payment System, a debit order ought only to be activated once 
there is money in an account. If there is none, the debit order ought to be 
refused. It should not be possible, while repaying a specific creditor, to go 
into a negative balance: to do so would contravene the law that prevents 
favoring certain lenders over others. Despite corporate denials that this 
was happening, the IT system seemed to allow a kind of parallel payments 
arrangement to exist.9 These technical complexities compounded the stark 
facts of the situation: Net1 was, in effect, using grant beneficiaries’ igno-
rance to turn a profit.
Advisers in South Africa’s charity and business sectors attempting 
to “claw back” funds from lenders often use the metaphor of piracy and 
plunder to describe the ransacking of grant holders’ monies. Unlike their 
UK equivalents, they are not able to challenge overpayments demands or 
to help clients put the brake on repayments. Since financial automation 
means that such repayment has already occurred, the advisor must set out, 
instead, to reclaim what has been “stolen.” “The bank account is almost a 
place for looting . . . for pushing through as many different [loans] as possi-
ble,” said an officer from the human rights charity sector. She celebrated the 
fact that, after much effort, she and her colleagues had helped a client “to 
get some of the money back, a cash refund.”
“Pillage” was the term used by the CEO of Summit Financial 
Partners, Clark Gardner, to describe the situation. Lenders of all sorts, he 
said, follow
an unwritten rule to chase market share. . . . [I]f I don’t take your wallet, your full 
wallet, someone else is going to take it. If you can afford R100 a month on debt 
installments, I want to take that full 100. Because if I take 80, someone else is going 
to take the other 20. That is putting my loan at risk. And no one is policing that. So 
I can do whatever I want. . . . [T]he lack of enforcement has . . . created a reckless 
lending environment. If you don’t play that game you’re going to lose.
This CEO has taken it upon himself, in the absence of activity by the 
state regulator (the NCR),10 to hire private investigators and pursue 
 moneylenders through civil court cases. Working in one particular case on 
behalf of borrowers who were waged employees rather than simply grant 
beneficiaries (the two categories often overlap), his company was taking a 
firm of attorneys to court for continuing—long after lenders themselves 
had been repaid for their loans—to chase debtors in order to get “collection 
fees.” Describing the modus operandi of this firm, Gardner told me how it
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gives you R500 [and] collects R11,000. And we said, “How do you go from R500 to 
R11,000?” The High Court said to the NCR, “You’ve got to investigate these guys—
you’ve got to find out what’s going on.” We promised the NCR 40,000 cases to inves-
tigate. But they’ve not done a thing. So we’ve spent our own money and gone to the 
courts. . . . How is this possible when [the relevant legislation] says that you can never 
charge more fees than the capital outstanding on default?
As one of Summit’s team members explained it to me:
It’s open to interpretation of what “collection costs” mean. We’re saying, “include 
legal costs and collection costs.” Because otherwise you’re going to have this unend-
ing amount of litigation fee, or collection fee, that people are going to end up paying 
back forever. The way the payments work is you first pay your collection costs, then 
you pay your legal fees, then you pay interest, then only you pay capital. So these 
people end up never paying off capital.
The court case brought by Summit was aimed at clarifying how much a 
lender may legitimately recoup from a borrower (the National Credit Act 
stipulates that a lender may never “charge more fees than the capital out-
standing on default”), as well as seeking recompense for the borrowers. At 
the time of writing, after the judge had dismissed the application without 
hearing its merits, Summit was lodging an appeal.11
These South African officers, paralegals, and corporate employers/
employees, like those who advise on debt in the UK, are motivated by a 
sense of the need to get the bureaucracy right, which they accomplish 
by unpicking the interwoven strands of debt in order to clarify which are 
serious or legitimate owings and which are not, and to highlight cases 
of fraud. For human rights charity The Black Sash, their opposition to 
what they call “grants grab” is underpinned by a strong tradition of rights 
activism accompanied by a “cause-lawyering” ethic. For Summit, a similar 
motivation exists but is combined with an impetus that comes, in part, 
from two major mining employers that have employed the company to 
act on their behalf in order to protect their employees. Summit’s Clark 
Gardner believes it ought to be possible to secure a “fair capitalist” system. 
In both cases, their efforts are focused not on preventing over-hasty or 
ill- considered repayment (as in the UK), but on retrieving illicitly looted 
funds so as to restore a client’s bank balance to what it should be. Insisting 
that the money be reimbursed, both aim to redress what they evocatively 
describe as “plunder.”
Informed by their notions of what ought to be, activists and paralegals in 
South Africa thus attempt to challenge the behavior of lenders. They also 
try to shape and reconfigure their advisees’ responses to the depredations 
of these lenders with the aim of creating a more humane way to live with 
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debt. In the UK case, countering the contradictory emotions of attachment 
and shame, advisers use bureaucratic tools in order to help the client parcel 
up and classify the various types of owing, showing why some of these 
ought to be given more priority than others. In South Africa, these  activist/
advisers are infused with a stronger conviction that the poor are being 
robbed. For them, it is less a matter of persuading people of their own best 
interests and nudging them to behave in certain ways, than of standing 
alongside them, shoulder-to-shoulder, against rapacious creditors. Given 
that the promise of post-apartheid democracy was one in which welfare—
and a sense of dignity—would be newly delivered to those dispossessed by 
apartheid, there is a strong moral sense that what is being stolen are these 
newly delivered aspects of citizenship—hence the prevalence of metaphors 
that invoke looting and grabbing. For the activists, the central guiding 
concept is one in which there is a pot of money that ought to be available to 
the poor in its entirety. Although that pot of money may need to be divided 
into appropriately targeted portions or piles (in a budgeting exercise), no 
part of it should find its way into the coffers of large financial firms. There 
is a feeling of outrage that this should even be possible. It is this sense of 
indignation that underpins their notion of budgeting or householding.
Tax and Services—the Other Side of Redistribution
Differences between the two modes of indebtedness and debt advice out-
lined above are, of course, shaped by a range of other factors, including 
those more usually associated with redistribution. Beyond welfare and 
grant payments, these include the way that taxes are levied to pay for those 
aspects of welfare—like healthcare and education—known as “benefits in 
kind” (Hills 2015: 63). The differences between the two countries discussed 
in this chapter are too many and too complex to cover in any detail, but 
contrasts between their broader welfare regimes and relative levels of for-
malization are worthy of a brief consideration.
Although social scientists, challenging the drawing of any simplistic 
dichotomy between “formal” and “informal” economies (Guyer 2004), 
point out that the informal economy has now “taken over the world” (Hart 
2015), there is still some value in contrasting a highly regulated and bureau-
cratized economy with one that is far less so. Factors that eventually led 
to the post 2010 austerity regime in the UK, following in the wake during 
the trente glorieuses of the establishment of a robust welfare state based on 
relatively effective taxation, contrast markedly to those at play in societies 
like South Africa, where there has been greater reliance on informal, often 
“unpaid” or unregistered, forms of work, welfare, and taxation (Bolt 2012; 
This chapter of "Financialization," edited by Chris Hann and Don Kalb is available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, 
thanks to the support of the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC Grant ES/M003825/1 ‘An ethnography of 
advice: between market, society and the declining welfare state’), the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2016-518), and the LSE 
Anthropology’s RIIF fund.
Redistribution and Indebtedness  * 211
Cichello, Fields, and Leibbrandt 2005; Gibbs 2018; Hull and James 2012; 
Neves and Du Toit 2012).
As we saw earlier in the case of Elaine’s “priority debts” in the UK case, 
the provision of secure accommodation, the services that accompany it, 
and the way revenue payments and taxes are recouped for these are all 
crucial when considering how wealth is reallocated in that country. Under 
the austerity regime, local councils there have started to pursue debtors 
with greater vigor than do commercial creditors (Kirwan 2018). As central 
government has cut their budgets, they are left with little option but to 
pursue repayment by those in arrears—even though, in a spirit of “enlight-
ened self-interest,” some of them simultaneously fund advice services to 
help these same people (Forbess and James 2017). In contrast, for low-paid 
workers and/or grant recipients in South Africa, although many do owe 
money for rent, utilities, or municipal/council services, these kinds of obli-
gations constitute a lower percentage of the overall debt burden. Recent 
democratization twinned with corruption scandals have, in the South 
African case, made the state both more circumspect about extending the 
revenue base beyond the “middle classes” and somewhat more reluctant to 
press for the effective repayment of bills owed to the state or its adjuncts for 
rent, utilities, and the like. Toward the end of apartheid (and subsequently), 
there was a long struggle over such payments, with rent and service boy-
cotts eventually countered, in more planned and formal areas, by state 
implementation of prepaid electricity and water meters (Von Schnitzler 
2016). In more recent times, with the electricity supply commission billions 
of rands in debt, local municipalities have started offering rebates to indi-
gent residents or giving them the opportunity to repay in small amounts, 
extending institutional reach while recognizing widespread inability. This 
again signals the hesitation about going after debts to the state.12 Increasing 
numbers, however, have taken up residence in informal settlements further 
from their places of employment, where rental and utility costs are rela-
tively low in relation to transport costs. For someone like Akhona, it was 
to cover the cost of traveling to work in privately owned taxies rather than 
to pay rent, taxes, or bills to the state that she took out the monthly loan of 
R200 from commercial creditor Moneyline.
In South Africa, the provision of housing and accompanying services 
is skewed by the coexistence of a thriving real-estate market in the cities, 
on the one hand, with informal rights (often under so-called “communal” 
tenure) in some peri-urban and rural areas, on the other. The battle over 
payments to the state—in a zone where “tax,” “rent,” and “service payments” 
become difficult to distinguish from “debt”—is still being fought. In the 
case of the UK, that battle (at least in relation to housing) was lost long ago. 
In the more formalized economy of the latter, the option to drive down 
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housing costs or get out of paying council tax by living in the kind of low-
cost “squatter” accommodation in which many South African grant holders 
reside is, of course, virtually nonexistent. The stock of state- provided 
housing, which once provided an alternative, is also rapidly shrinking. 
There was a moment in the heyday of the UK’s welfare state when social 
housing, generally affordable if one received housing benefit, was avail-
able to those who relied on welfare for part or all of their livelihood. In a 
context where housing itself—even in the low-cost sector—is being rapidly 
financialized (Aalbers 2017), the diminished supply of this accommodation 
makes welfare beneficiaries increasingly reliant on private landlords, many 
of whom are reluctant to accept tenants who depend on benefits, or are 
ready to seek eviction when their tenants default.13
Asymmetries in the way local taxes and payments are levied—or 
avoided—thus fill out the picture of contrasting forms of debt advice/ 
activism I have painted above. If Elaine was more vulnerable to having the 
local state demand payment (sourced from her welfare benefits alongside 
her meager income) for services, and/or to eviction by her private landlord, 
Akhona’s primary threat was from private companies who were deducting 
funds, similarly derived from a mix of state grants and her wage, directly 
from her bank account. In the first case, we are witnessing the undoing of 
a welfare state through a regime of enforced austerity; in the second, we 
are seeing its flimsy low-cost construction using the medium of cash trans-
fers.14 In both cases, the work of activist/advisers is key to preventing the 
collapse of redistributive processes.
Conclusion
This chapter has contrasted two models of budgetary logic developed 
by debt activist/advisers. Working within a hybrid “mixed economy” of 
welfare, partly funded by financial companies as well as other sources, they 
operate at a relatively micro level rather than via “large-scale” arrangements 
(Bähre 2011). In settings where the hegemonic powers of capitalism seem 
to be operating unchecked, and where more ambitious reinstantiations 
of the welfare state or more radical reconfigurations of lending regimes 
seem destined to run into the sand, these agents facilitate redistribution by 
helping their clients or by pooling their knowledge to provide evidence for 
court cases in order to push back against unjust demands.
In both settings, advisers are motivated by a wish to promote sustain-
able householding. In the UK, austerity policies mean that government 
agencies are withdrawing what was previously, in the heyday of the welfare 
state, publicly funded and seen as a right. People are encouraged to turn to 
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increasingly fragile casual (or “zero hours” contract) employment rather 
than relying on benefits, while also being pushed to practice frugality and 
to “economize.” Advisers, as “second order decision makers” in Jon Elster’s 
sense, both enforce but also contrive to undermine these agendas. Here, 
“householding” means maximizing income from dwindling sources, and 
challenging repayment obligations. In South Africa, a recent democratic 
transition—combined with financial liberalization and accompanied by 
growing unemployment—has encouraged a borrowing boom. Despite the 
difficulty of reversing a long-standing tendency to extractivism, now in 
heavily financialized form, partly private/corporate initiatives have stepped 
in where the state refuses to go, functioning to curb the otherwise untram-
meled activities of lenders. Here, “householding” means seeking to reclaim 
appropriated funds while tirelessly working to challenge, in court, those 
who ransack pay packets and bank accounts.
To say that an “ethics of care” (Lawson 2007) is central to the work that 
advisers do is not, of course, to celebrate unmitigated success. Care can 
direct the distribution of resources, but it can also misallocate them, as I 
have shown in a 2020 article co-written with Insa Koch: “In debt advice, 
where the state, the market and charity are locked in an uneasy embrace, 
payments take on different moral meanings: they may be viewed as owed 
to the state so as to balance the fiscus and contribute to the common good, 
or owed to financial creditors where they accrue as immoral profit” (Koch 
and James 2020). While it is true, as shown in this chapter, that “financial 
corporations, in recognition of the negative way they are perceived, have 
started to subsidize advice and are newly endowed with moral agency,” 
it is equally true that the (re-)emergence of paternalistic forms of charity 
(through faith-based, unpaid advice work) indicate a neo-Victorian remor-
alization of poverty (ibid.).
The ambivalence surrounding advisers’ work relates to their positioning 
in a space where boundaries blur between redistributive welfare, wages, 
debt, and financialized capitalism. But, although their work is situated 
where the state neither provides adequate benefits nor adequately regulates 
the depredations of those lenders whose loaned money is an essential part 
of “debtfare,” such blurring should not necessarily be seen as yet one further 
stage in the onward march of financialized capitalism in its most egregious 
form. Nor is it an outcome of what Graeber calls “the iron law of liberalism” 
in which “the government itself ” has become “the main mechanism for 
the extraction of corporate profits” (2015: 24). Instead, the advice officers 
and decision-makers presented in this chapter have a normative view of 
bureaucratic procedure, which guides their use of formalized techniques to 
enact change beyond the orbit of state, market, and society, although linked 
to all three. As with second-order decision makers elsewhere, “the appeal of 
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rule-bound bureaucracy lies in the desire to constrain arbitrary . . . power” 
(Weinberg 2017: 1101). Advisers help clients “bureaucratize their lives,” 
not (or not only) in the spirit of complying with repayment demands but of 
challenging them, reversing the flow of money those demands enable, and 
buttressing and even recreating a sphere—however contradictory—of what 
Bear and Mathur (2015) call the “new public good.”
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2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-45343236. Accessed 14 January 2020.
2. If a creditor is owed money and presents an employer with a garnishee order,
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been the  principle targets of lenders using these repayment technologies with 
ever-increasing frequency, causing great concern to these industries at higher 
levels. The accumulation of multiple debts, paid back to a series of creditors in 
rapid succession as soon as payday arrives, means that many earners have little left 
to live on (James 2019: 225; James and Rajak 2014: 455–56).
3. Ciaran Ryan, “Confessions of a Debt Counsellor,” Moneyweb, 19 July 2018, https://
www.moneyweb.co.za/mymoney/moneyweb-financial-planning/confessions-of-
a-debt-counsellor-turned-whistleblower/. Accessed 14 January 2020.
4. The maximum debt level for a Debt Relief Order is £20,000 (Kirwan 2018).
5. The exchange rate was about 18ZAR = 1GBP.
6. Pharie Sefali, “Money Lender Targets Social Grant Beneficiaries,” GroundUp, 21
July 2015. https://www.groundup.org.za/article/money-lender-targets-social- 
grant-beneficiaries_3140/. Accessed 14 January 2020.
7. Erin Torkelson, “Deductions from Social Grants: How It All Works,” GroundUp,
3 March 2017, https://www.groundup.org.za/article/deductions-social-grants-
how-it-works/. Accessed 14 January 2020. Erin Torkelson, “Sophia’s Choice: Farm
Worker Has to Decide Which of Her Children to Feed,” GroundUp, 15 March
2017, https://www.groundup.org.za/article/sophias-choice-farm-worker-has- 
decide-which-her-children-feed. Accessed 14 January 2020.
8. The Common Financial Statement, http://www.cfs.moneyadvicetrust.org
(accessed 14 January 2020), is an Excel-based budget sheet that represented “a
uniform approach to . . . financial statements . . . to encourage consistent responses
from creditors” and enable “a fair resolution.” It has been replaced by the Standard
Financial Statement (Money Advice Service 2018).
9. Discussion with officers of The Black Sash, team members of Summit Financial
Partners, Geoff Budlender, Erin Torkelson, 15th February 2018. Following a public
outcry, the outcome of a Constitutional Court case saw the contract for awarding
social grants withdrawn from Net1 and awarded to the Post Office (Breckenridge
2019). Some of these anomalies might have been remedied since, but my interloc-
utors in 2018 were skeptical.
10. The National Credit Regulator was established by the National Credit Act of 2005.
Described by The Wall Street Journal as a “consumer advocate that is charged with 
registering lenders,” it has not had the political or economic clout to do much more 
than register lenders and produce reports on debt levels (James 2015: 30).
11. Carin Smith, “How Some Attorneys Turn R500 Debt into R10,000,” fin24, 20 July
2016, https://www.fin24.com/Money/Debt/how-some-attorneys-can-turn-r500-
debt-into-r10-000-20160720. Accessed 14 January 2020. Although the firm of
attorneys indicated its willingness to settle if that meant abiding by the Act in
future, it was unwilling to “pay back all of that money” already extracted from
unsuspecting borrowers.
12. Maxim Bolt, personal communication; Joburg, “Expanded Social Package Rebates,” 
https://www.joburg.org.za/services_/Pages/City%20Services/Rebates/Expand
ed-Social-Package-Rebates.aspx. Accessed 14 January 2020.
13. Given that councils to a certain extent retain responsibility to ensure that resi-
dents do not suffer eviction or become homeless, many have begun to buy housing 
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stock in more affordable places far away from London, where they rehouse evicted 
tenants. Matt Wilde, “Our Immoral Housing Policy Is Set Up to Punish the Poor,” 
The Guardian, 26 September 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis 
free/2016/sep/26/immoral-housing-policy-punish-poor-councils-poverty-peo 
ple-losing-homes. Accessed 14 January 2020.
14. Dar Es Salaam and Dakar, “How Africa Is Creating Welfare States: Africa Is Stitch-
ing Together Social Safety-Nets Even Though It Is Still Poor,” The Economist, 21
February 2019, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/02/23/
how-africa-is-creating-welfare-states. Accessed 14 January 2020.
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